What We Can't Not Know
September 03, 2006
This past week, I finished reading What We Can’t Not Know: A Guide, by J. Budziszewski, professor of government and philosophy at the University of Texas. In entertaining and accessible fashion, Budziszewksi argues the case for the natural law, asserting that:
there are some moral truths that we all really know – truths which a normal human being is unable not to know. They are a universal possession, an emblem of rational mind, an heirloom of the family of man. (p.19)
Budziszewski’s effort is a bold one in an era when the prevailing wisdom is that there is no absolute, universal truth – let alone any moral truth – and that all truth is relative and subjective, nothing more than a contrivance of the ruling class designed to entrench its interests.
What are these moral truths that all humans allegedly really know? More precisely, what will “the great majority of us in all times and places admit that we know”? Budziszewski shares John M. Cooper’s answer from 1931:
[1] Respect the Supreme Being or the benevolent being or beings who take his place. Do not “blaspheme.” [2] Care for your children. [3] Malicious murder or [4] maiming, [5] stealing, [6] deliberate slander or “black” lying, when committed against friend or unoffending fellow clansman or tribesman, are reprehensible. [7] Adultery proper is wrong, even though there be exceptional circumstances that permit or enjoin it and even though sexual relations among the unmarried may be viewed leniently. [8] Incest is a heinous offence. (p.20)
Are you surprised to see any of these eight on the list? I sure was. I didn’t expect to see #1 – respect the Supreme Being. I know too many people who not only reject the notion of a Supreme Being but deride those who seek to submit to His will.
This raises an obvious question, one Professor Budziszewksi deals with at length: how can so many people claim not to know what we all allegedly know? The answer: to claim the existence of a moral truth is not to claim that humans never pretend to be ignorant of it, even though they do. “[T]wo universals are in conflict: universal moral knowledge and universal desire to evade it.” (p.28) From a Christian perspective, we owe moral knowledge to our creation, and the desire to evade it to our fall.
As Budziszewski points out, our limited, finite and fallen minds rarely do a good job of denying and evading the existence of God. For example, ask the agnostic who claims ignorance about God whether it is possible to know something about God. He has two answers from which to choose: yes, it is possible; or no, it is impossible.
If he concedes that it is possible to know something about God but that he does not know it, then he condemns himself, for he is too lazy to learn the most important thing. To justify himself he would have to maintain that knowledge of God is not the most important thing, but that would be merely to claim that something else is God – and that he already knows all about it.
On the other hand, if he claims that it is impossible to know anything about God:
he contradicts himself, for to know God’s unknowability would be to know something about God. Indeed, it would be to know a great deal about Him. [1] one would have to assume that He is infinitely distant, because otherwise one could not be so sure that knowledge about Him is impossible. [2] one would have to assume that He is unconcerned, because otherwise one would expect Him to have provided the means for one to know Him. [3] Finally, one would have to assume that He is completely unlike the portrayal of Him in the Bible, because in that account He does care about us and has already provided the means for us to know Him. (pp.64-65)
Budziszewski’s logic cuts right to the heart of the agnostic, laying bare our boundless ability to deceive ourselves.
The next time a person describes himself to me as an agnostic, I think I’ll ask him whether it’s possible to know something about God. If he seems receptive, then perhaps we’ll gently explore the implications of his answer.
