The “Gay Marriage” Debate: Valuable Reminders from a Libertarian
September 16, 2006
Thanks to friends at BreakPoint for pointing me to a thoughtful discussion of the gay marriage debate penned by libertarian blogger Jane Galt. Like Galt, I often hear the following type of exchange between social conservatives, on one side, and progressives, on the other.
The social conservative says:
[M]arriage is an ancient institution, which has been carefully selected for throughout human history. It is a bedrock of our society; if it is destroyed, we will all be much worse off. (See what happened to the inner cities between 1960 and 1990 if you do not believe this.) For some reason, marriage always and everywhere, in every culture we know about, is between a man and a woman; this seems to be an important feature of the institution. We should not go mucking around and changing this extremely important institution, because if we make a bad change, the institution will fall apart.
To which, the social progressive replies:
Why on earth would it make any difference to me whether gay people are getting married? Why would that change my behavior as a heterosexual? . . .
I will get married even if marriage is expanded to include gay people; I cannot imagine anyone up and deciding not to get married because gay people are getting married; therefore, the whole idea is ridiculous and bigoted.
Disclaiming any allegiance to either side of the debate, Galt makes three points about the content of the debate that are worth highlighting. Point one: people who focus on the fact that they would marry even if gay people marry are ignoring that they may not be the marginal case. Galt appeals to income tax debates to explain this common error.
[E]conomists hear this sort of argument all the time. “That’s ridiculous! I would never start working fewer hours because my taxes went up!” This ignores the fact that you may not be the marginal case. The marginal case may be some consultant who just can’t justify sacrificing valuable leisure for a new project when he’s only making 60 cents on the dollar. The result will nonetheless be the same: less economic activity. Similarly, you--highly educated, firmly socialised, upper middle class you--may not be the marginal marriage candidate; it may be some high school dropout in Tuscaloosa. That doesn’t mean that the institution of marriage won’t be weakened in America just the same.
Point two: recent history demonstrates that a change at the margin tends to destigmatize the next change, generating dramatic unforeseen effects. Galt reminds us of three 20th century examples: the inception of the income tax, the extension of welfare to unwed mothers, and the relaxation of divorce statutes.
- Income Taxes: When initially debated, legislators concluded it was unnecessary to impose a cap on the income tax rate. It was thought that the American people would revolt if the income tax were to grow above a few percentage points, providing a sufficient check on the government’s avarice. Those reasonable prognosticators forgot to consider that “Changing the law can, and does, change the culture of the thing regulated,” as Galt says. The implementation of “the income tax allowed for a slow creep that eroded the American resistance to income taxation.”
- Welfare for Unwed Mothers: In the late fifties, debate intensified over whether to extend benefits to the unmarried. Opponents to the extension worried that if we were to give money to unmarried mothers, there numbers would increase. “That’s just silly [said the activists]. I just can’t imagine anyone deciding to get pregnant out of wedlock simply because there are welfare benefits available.” Silly or not, “the marginal cases did have children out of wedlock, which made it more acceptable for the next marginal case to do so.” The result: a startling increase in the rate of out-of-wedlock births.
- Divorce: It used to be extremely difficult to get a divorce. Critics of lowering the bar warned that making divorce easier would increase its frequency. “That’s ridiculous!” said the reformers. . . . “People stay married because marriage is a bedrock institution of our society, not because of some law! The only people who get divorced will be people who have terrible problems! A few percentage points at most!” Unfortunately, we’ve gotten much more divorce than anyone imagined.
The third of Galt’s noteworthy points concerns gay marriage advocates’ oft-repeated “ridiculous and bigoted” accusation: “the whole idea [that marriage should be limited to one man and one woman] is ridiculous and bigoted.” Great care should be taken before allowing a person to reform an institution that she sees as merely “ridiculous and bigoted.” Galt reminds us of the timeless advice of G.K. Chesterton in The Thing:
In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.”
This paradox rests on the most elementary common sense. The gate or fence did not grow there. It was not set up by somnambulists who built it in their sleep. It is highly improbable that it was put there by escaped lunatics who were for some reason loose in the street. Some person had some reason for thinking it would be a good thing for somebody. And until we know what the reason was, we really cannot judge whether the reason was reasonable. It is extremely probable that we have overlooked some whole aspect of the question, if something set up by human beings like ourselves seems to be entirely meaningless and mysterious. There are reformers who get over this difficulty by assuming that all their fathers were fools; but if that be so, we can only say that folly appears to be a hereditary disease. But the truth is that nobody has any business to destroy a social institution until he has really seen it as an historical institution. If he knows how it arose, and what purposes it was supposed to serve, he may really be able to say that they were bad purposes, or that they have since become bad purposes, or that they are purposes which are no longer served. But if he simply stares at the thing as a senseless monstrosity that has somehow sprung up in his path, it is he and not the traditionalist who is suffering from an illusion.
I’m sure there is much about which Jane Galt and I would disagree on “gay marriage” and other issues. But I wholeheartedly agree with her on these three broadly applicable points: (1) we would be wise to remember that we may not be the “marginal case”; (2) changes at the margin can result in dramatic unforeseen changes to the core of an institution; and (3) let’s make sure that would-be reformers have a thorough understanding of an institution before allowing them to tear it down.


